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Abstract
We identify two distinct yet complementary epistemological paths to knowledge
development. The first one is holistic and field dependent and builds on the concept of
plausibility; this path we associate with an entrepreneurial mindset. The second is objectoriented and builds on the concept of probability; this path we associate with the managerial
mindset. We believe that both managerial and knowledge management practices have
emphasized the second path at the expense of the first. To restore the balance, knowledge
management needs to develop processes and tools that will allow it to credibly operate in
possible and plausible worlds, so as to extract value from them. We propose a systems
framework for thinking through the nature of such tools.
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1.Introduction
We are interested in the evolution of knowledge management as a sub-discipline of
management. Specifically we are concerned with how knowledge-bearing agents (individuals
or groups of individuals with similar knowledge) develop and deploy to create value for
themselves, or in other words manage their knowledge. Much of what today passes for
knowledge management has its origins in practice, and qua practice, knowledge management
has not much bothered with epistemological issues. Yet without secure epistemological
foundations, knowledge management is unlikely to evolve from a practice into an intellectual
discipline. In this paper we argue that knowledge management is open to multiple
epistemologies, which give access to alternative types of knowledge worlds, each with
characteristic challenges and opportunities for knowledge management: possible worlds,
plausible worlds, probable worlds and actual worlds. Knowledge-bearing agents (hereinafter
“agents”) use their knowledge in these worlds to take actions that secure future resources.
The challenge for knowledge agents is to deploy scarce their resources in each of these
knowledge worlds in such a way as to secure sustaining resources that exceed the resources
committed. A key challenge for knowledge management is to understand the nature of , and
the boundaries between, these worlds and, by implication, how and under what circumstances
they can appropriately be crossed by knowledge agents. This paper explores the nature and
boundaries of these worlds and shows how they can be construed as sources of opportunities
and of value for those who know how to move within and across them.
Consider the following investment events:
•

In the Internet bubble of the mid 1990s, small firms raised huge sums of venture
capital in large numbers. Many came to market with little or no track record to speak
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of and never having made a profit. Investors placed their money in these firms on the
strength of what their rudimentary business plans promised and of a blind faith in the
future of the Internet. The bubble burst in 2000 and the irrational exuberance of the
market for these online companies, even ones with real potential, vanished with it.
•

One day, before going on a trip to the United States, Masaru Ibuka (then Honorary
Chairman of Sony) asked Norio Ohga (then Executive Deputy President) for a simple,
playback-only stereo version of the ‘Pressman’, the small, monaural tape recorder that
Sony had launched in 1977. He wanted to be able to take something light and portable
with him on his travels. In 1979, Sony launched the ‘Soundabout’, a personal stereo
that was later relabelled the Walkman. It was developed on the basis of nothing more
than a strong personal hunch. Sony expected to sell 5000 Walkmans a month. Within
two months of the product launch it was selling ten time that amount and has since
become a cultural icon.

•

Inside large organizations, innovative managers approach their board with
meticulously drawn up business plans and a mixture of objective statistical facts and
estimates to justify these plans. The managers proposing these plans know - and often,
the members of the board know - that these highly uncertain estimates are tentative
and thus very likely to change as events unfold. Nevertheless, based on the evidence
provided by the figures the board will decide whether or not investment in these
proposals is justified.

Entrepreneurs persuade venture capitalists to invest with

perhaps even more uncertain business plans.
•

To be sure that they can meet their obligations, pension funds are required to place a
significant proportion of their resources in risk-free investments. For this reason they
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invest part of their cash in money market instruments of proven reliability. This is a
highly liquid form of investment that yields low returns but is certain to give back the
cash originally invested.
In pursuit of an appropriate knowledge management perspective, in what follows we
conceive of knowledge as comprising a set of beliefs which informs decisions by agents to
take actions that consume the agent’s (scarce) resources. With this conception of knowledge,
each of the above cases involves deploying knowledge: that is, it involves taking action that
consumes the resources of agents on the basis of sets of beliefs that these hold individually or
collectively. In the first example, the beliefs were vague and carried little or no justification
and the risk was significant. In the last example, the justification is well established and the
degree of certainty is high. In the second example, what mattered was the strength with which
the belief was personally held by a powerful decision-maker, irrespective of whether it could
be justified to outsiders. And in the third example the key requirement was to justify the belief
to members of the board, whether or not one held it oneself. In each of the above examples,
action is a commitment of resources to belief in a perceived opportunity. In the four cases,
beliefs are more or less strongly held, and more or less capable of being justified to outsiders.
The opportunity is characterized by high or low levels of uncertainty that gets eliminated with
the passage of time. In a world characterised by complexity, variety and uncertainty, the
challenge is to take actions that are appropriate to the nature of the belief that is held, and to
match the latter to the level of uncertainty that inheres in a given situation
Such a matching exercise illustrates Ross Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety. This states
that the variety of stimuli impinging upon a system must be countered by the variety of
responses that the system can muster. As Ashby put it, only variety can destroy variety.1 Yet
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some variety constitutes noise for the system and therefore calls for no response by the system
save that of filtering it out. A system that is incapable of filtering out noise from the set of
stimuli that it responds to is condemned to dissipating its scarce resources unproductively as it
overreacts to every opportunity or threat, real or imagined. Variety reduction then becomes
necessary in order to filter out stimuli that do not give rise to actionable beliefs – i.e. to a form
of knowledge. However, in intelligent systems, that is, systems capable of forging meaningful
representations of the states of the world that they respond to, what constitutes noise and what
constitutes information for them will itself be a function of their models of the world – i.e.,
the prior beliefs that they apply to the interpretation of stimuli.2 And the larger the number of
models that the system can choose from, the wider the range of possible interpretations of
stimuli available to it. Also, by implication, the larger the number of models that the system
can choose from, the more tentative and uncertain become the filtering processes that
distinguish information from noise.
The law of requisite variety is a call to action, and knowledge is an essential ingredient of
effective action.3 But what is likely to constitute sufficient knowledge to take action? How do
the different types of belief that an agent is willing to act upon relate to each other? And how
do they increase in certainty? Furthermore, intelligent action is action that can handle variety
adaptively within a given time frame – requisite variety has a time dimension. How, then, to
zero in on the relevant models and appropriate beliefs in a timely fashion?
Getting answers to questions such as these is likely to grow in importance in the
coming years. The questions can be subsumed under a broader one: how might we
economically manage our scarce knowledge resources under conditions of uncertainty? The
burgeoning field of knowledge management has hardly ever framed its challenges - let alone
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attempted to answer them - in these terms. Why so? We argue that to be able to answer such
questions, knowledge management will need to develop its epistemology – for our purpose,
the question of what constitutes valid knowledge under different circumstances. Epistemology
provides the basis for action and thus serves as a foundation for the institutionalization of
practice. Absent a credible epistemology, knowledge management is playing Hamlet without
the Prince, condemned to remain a loose collection of empirical practices rather than evolving
into a full-fledged intellectual discipline.
Epistemology, however, is not physics. Its principles and its application will vary
according to time and place. There is therefore a need to identify the different circumstances –
social, technological, economic, etc - in which knowledge is considered valid and actionable.
In this paper, we unpack the Platonic view of knowledge as “justified true belief” into
combinations of its different components. We argue that different mindsets will emphasize
different combinations of the components “belief”, “truth” and “justification”.
We shall proceed as follows. In the next section 2, we introduce some of the
epistemological issue that confront knowledge management and put forward a simple scheme
for relating these to each other. In section 3 we provide a brief overview of the current state of
knowledge management as well as of its antecedents in the institutions of science. In section
4, we show the relevance of our interpretive scheme for the current challenges that confront
knowledge management. A conclusion follows in section 5.
2. Defining Epistemological Boundaries
Epistemology – further discussed in our appendix - is the study of the nature of
knowledge and justification.4 Plato, aiming at the attainment of certainty, an infallible state of
mind,5 took knowledge and uncertainty to be antithetical to each other. In the Meno and the
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Theaetetus (c. 400 b.c.) he defined knowledge to be justified true belief. This definition
identifies three individually necessary and jointly sufficient components of what counts as
infallible propositional knowledge: a truth condition, a justification condition, and a belief
condition.
While it is appropriate for philosophical debate, when it comes to resource allocation
decisions the Platonic definition of knowledge, which demands true justified belief, is too
restrictive. More crass than Plato, we are interested in knowledge that informs agent action.
We suggest that it is beliefs that underpin agent action – so an agent can have justified true
beliefs; justified beliefs; true beliefs; and, unconstrained beliefs. Thus different kinds of
knowledge are possible, not all of which can be expressed propositionally and not all of which
require the presence of all the three components for action-based knowledge.
The naturalistic perspective on knowledge, for example, concerns itself with
possibilities for action in which knowledge, as well as being representational, can be tacit6 or
embodied in skills and know-how7 – what the Greeks termed techne. From this perspective,
one drops the truth condition and settles for justified belief as a ground for action – if it is tacit
or embodied, such belief may not take an explicitly propositional form and nor will its
justification. If, on the other hand, one drops the justification condition, an agent may settle
for true belief alone – i.e. an agent may be willing to act on beliefs that square with its own
prior experience without seeking to justify such beliefs to others. Finally, an agent may settle
for belief tout court and act on a ‘hunch’ where neither truth or justification are involved. In
the last two cases, however, a price is paid in the form of a loss of social legitimation of the
belief in question. Those agents who ‘have the courage of their beliefs’, however, are often
willing to pay the price.
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As we have said above, the challenge for agents is to deploy scarce resources in each
of the knowledge worlds in such a way that the agent secures sustaining resources that exceed
the resources committed. Such sustaining resources are only secured in actual worlds – ie,
those characterized by certainty. In worlds characterized by varying degrees of uncertainty,
however, there is some advantage in being able to develop appropriate forms of knowledge
and to be able to migrate from one world to another in line with changing levels of
uncertainty.
Thus, we can take the three components of justified true beliefs as representing
different types of constraints on our definition of knowledge and then go on to rank different
epistemologies by the degree of constraint that they impose upon us. Clearly, the most
demanding constraints on our beliefs are that they should be both justified and true. As we go
about our daily business, few of our beliefs are ever actually called upon to pass this
demanding test and, indeed, few, if any, of our daily actions are based upon such
epistemologically demanding conditions. We can greatly expand what we will count as valid
knowledge, therefore, by dropping the truth condition and settling for a justification condition
on its own. That is the strategy adopted by science. It is constrained by the requirements of
justification – an essentially social process based on the authority of sensory evidence and
logic rather than on charismatic or institutional authority - but no more than this.
Alternatively, we can drop the justification condition, acting solely on the basis of true
belief – a strategy that gives more scope to personal intuition, conviction and experience. Of
course, this type of knowledge often being highly subjective6, we may be unable to get others
to accept it and we may then end up acting alone. Finally, we can have a large number of
beliefs that are unconstrained by either a truth or a justification requirement but that we are
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still willing to act upon, albeit in a more cautious and tentative fashion – i.e. we hedge our
bets.
We represent our constraint-relaxation model in the form of a Venn diagram (see
Figure 1). The diagram has two intersecting circles set inside a larger circle. The larger circle,
1, represents the full range of what we can take to be knowledge – i.e. beliefs that to some
degree we are willing to act upon. The two intersecting circles, 2 and 3, represent the more
restricted views of knowledge, i.e. those that either meet the truth condition, the justification
condition, or both. Clearly, the most constraining condition is to be found in the area given by
the intersection of circles 1 and 2. The least constraining one is given by belief on its own –
i.e. Circle 1 minus circles 2 and 3. We briefly discuss each condition in turn:
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1.Possible worlds
Whatever gives rise to beliefs that
individuals are, to some extent, willing to
act upon

2.Plausible Worlds

Actual Worlds

3.Probable worlds

Beliefs that strike an
Individual as being true

Justified true beliefs

Beliefs that have to be
Justified to others

Figure1: Possible, Plausible, Probable and Actual Worlds

Circle 1 minus circles 2 and 3 describes beliefs that are constrained neither by truth nor
justification requirements. Here, ‘anything goes’8 providing that it does not contradict the
laws of logic or of physics – i.e. providing that it is not actually impossible. Such
unconstrained beliefs give us possible worlds. These worlds are characterized by phenomena
to which no probabilities can (yet) be attached. This has two origins. The first is that a given
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phenomenon may not give rise to discernible events that are amenable to measurement – i.e.
the phenomenon will not be identifiable and hence it will not be possible to distinguish an
event from a non-event. The second is that even if an event is so discernible, it may not be
repeatable within an empirically relevant time frame and hence cannot give rise to a
probability distribution.9 These have reproducibility as a core requirement. In short, possible
worlds lack both the clarity and the regularity that underpin the formation of rational
expectations. Here, neither memory, nor perhaps even perception, has much purchase. At the
height of the Dotcom boom, a good number of start-up firms were sustained by little more
than the possible worlds that they had identified for over-gullible or overly optimistic and
greedy investors.
•

Circle 2 describes beliefs that are constrained by a truth requirement but not by a
justification requirement. Like justification, truth requires both coherence and
correspondence with the facts. Yet in the absence of an external reference group,
whatever strikes one as coherent and in correspondence with the facts – i.e. as being
true - will remain personal and subjective rather than inter-subjectively validated. It
may be based on deep intuitions and extensive personal experience but, unless an
agent possesses a strong charismatic authority, it may prove hard to convince others of
a truth without providing sharable evidence that would be acceptable to them. We are
here in a plausible world, one which individuals might reasonably act upon but which
lacks the objective (or inter-subjective) justification for collective action. It was inside
such a subjectively derived plausible world that Masaru Ibuka of Sony initiated the
design of what was to become the Sony Walkman. The decision could be justified on
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the basis neither of reasoned arguments nor or observed regularities. Ibuka was able to
act on the strength of entrepreneurial hunch alone.
•

Circle 3 removes the constraint imposed by a requirement for truth and accommodates
beliefs that have been justified. Where justification is not based on revelation or
authority – we will not deal with these here - but rather on objectively demonstrable
coherence and correspondence with the facts, such beliefs access probable worlds.
These are worlds in which rational expectations can be developed and shared on the
basis of the discernible regularities that reside in past experiences. They are accessible
to probabilistic and statistical analysis, and allow action to be based on calculable risk.
For this reason probable worlds can be justified to others. In our earlier examples,
managers and entrepreneurs who lacked the resources to back their own hunches in the
way that Ibuka did at Sony, had to justify their beliefs to board members or venture
capitalists by presenting carefully analysed technical and financial data as evidence.
We noted that they themselves did not have to believe in the truth of this evidence in
order to put it forward as justification.

•

The intersection of circles 1 and 2 accommodates Plato’s definition of knowledge, i.e.
justified true belief. Such beliefs, justified to others either directly by the evidence
provided by the senses or by the inferences that these allow, access actual worlds in
which experience has immediacy and is indubitable. I do not doubt the existence of the
laptop computer on which I am typing this paper; it is here, before my very eyes. Nor,
typically, do I doubt the veracity of my bank statement, when it credits my account
with a cheque that I paid in yesterday. The truth of my own experience squares with
the justification provided by the bank statement to reinforce my belief that my account
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has just been topped up by an amount corresponding to the value of the cheque. It is
this kind of certainty that pension funds pursue in their investment strategies.
Each of the regions in the Venn diagram offers a distinct epistemological perspective that,
to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, will have validity to all of the players some of the time and
to some of the players all of the time. One geometrical consequence of our Venn diagram is
that both the number of plausible and of probable worlds is larger than the number of actual
worlds, and that the number of possible worlds, in turn, exceeds the number of plausible and
probable worlds. Actual worlds can be represented as singular outcomes that can be intersubjectively agreed upon; plausible worlds contain singular outcomes that will not necessarily
command inter-subjective agreement; probable worlds can be represented as a probability
distribution of outcomes defined over a given range; possible worlds can be represented as a
range of outcomes over which no probability distribution can be specified.
Each region in the diagram yields some kind of actionable knowledge even though
only the intersection of circles 2 and 3 inside circle 1 yields the kind of knowledge that would
have been acceptable to Plato or Kant. The knowledge in each region, therefore, has some
value for action, but typically, any action in the real world will to some extent draw its
epistemic resources from all regions simultaneously.
Furthermore, action, by generating new knowledge, will shift epistemic resources
from one circle to another in both the inward and the outward direction. How, specifically,
might we establish the value-for-action of these different kinds of knowledge?
In Figure 2 we take action as requiring some kind of a resource commitment that varies
according to the world that an agent finds itself in.
Taking each world in turn:
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Possible Worlds are characterized by unconstrained beliefs. An undiscriminating
commitment to all possibilities would quickly deplete the agent’s resources. Resource
commitments to action therefore must be highly tentative and can only be based on the option
value of a selected set of possibilities. Framed in terms of action, an agent might – just - get
what it pays for. Scenario thinking in organizations exemplifies the kind of thinking required
in possible worlds. Over time, some subsets of possible scenarios may acquire plausibility on
account of their coherence; other subsets, with accumulating empirical evidence, may come to
seem probable. In this way, from possible worlds an agent can gradually move either toward
plausible worlds, toward probable worlds, or towards both simultaneously. The knowledge
that inheres in possible worlds is generative of value, but it remains provisional. In possible
worlds anything is possible – knowledge in this space comprises beliefs in possibilities - hints
and hunches about what linkages among beliefs might be. However there is not yet any
coherence of linkage among these hints, nor with the insight or experience of the agent.
Furthermore, there is no history or evidence by which to corroborate and justify these
hunches. The challenge for the agent is to recognize the potential for forging value from
some subset of these possibilities by taking out options to exploit the value of whatever
hunches can be navigated – either through plausible worlds or probable worlds (where profit
potentials are created) into actual worlds, where value is captured.
Plausible Worlds: Knowledge here also has value, but now only for the agent
(individuals or groups with common belief) holding the belief. In plausible worlds knowledge
is true for the agent (but not necessarily for other agents) in the sense that the linkages among
beliefs held by the agent have coherence with one another and with the agent’s experience, in
other words the set of beliefs is plausible to that agent. The challenge for the agent is to
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recognize the potential for creating value from some subset of plausibilities by making
“speculative” investments in these opportunities unseen by others. The agent thereby creates
the potential to capture abnormal profits in the form of Knightian rents derived from the
agent’s idiosyncratic insights. Expectations are sufficiently coherent and grounded in the
agent’s experience to justify applying an agent-specific discount rate. The subjective net
present value that results will reflect the application of the agent’s idiosyncratic insight rather than objective criteria. In a plausible world an agent may strongly believe that it will
get what it pays for, but, in the absence either of objective evidence to justify such a belief, or
of a strong personal charisma, the agent will not easily persuade other agents to pay along
with it.
Probable Worlds: In probable space knowledge is justified in that the linkages among
the set of beliefs can be corroborated by external evidence. Through empirical testing and
replication the outcomes can be replicated and a probability distribution assigned, thus
creating socially justifiable probabilities. The challenge for the agent is to recognize the
potential for creating value from some subset of probabilities by making risk-adjusted
investments which create the potential for normal profits. The kind of replicable empirical
knowledge available in probable worlds allows for the application of a socially derived
discount rate; it thus has an objective net present value. Framed in terms of action, an agent
will probably get what it pays for. Much scientific knowledge is of this type, not indubitable,
but, on account of systematically recorded repetitions and replicated tests, highly
corroborated and hence, highly probable.
Actual Worlds: In actual worlds knowledge comprises true, justified belief – either the
agent is in a spot market where cash flows immediately out of spot contract or the emergent
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successes of agents’ investments in options, speculations or projects are cashed out. We
argue, as William James did, that the certain knowledge available in such worlds to any agent
which has direct or indirect access to the sensory evidence, has cash value.10 Framed in terms
of action, the agent will certainly get what it pays for, and so will those who pay with it.
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1.Possible worlds
(options)

2.Plausible Worlds
(Subjective NPV)

Actual
Worlds
(Profits)

3.Probable worlds
(Objective NPV)

Figure 2: The Value of Different Worlds

The diagram highlights the fact that an agent has two quite distinct paths for navigating
from possible to actual worlds:
•

Via plausible worlds – an agent starts off building coherence into its beliefs thus
moving from the possible to the plausible, and then seeks to establish a
correspondence between these coherent beliefs and the real world in oreder to justify
them.

20

•

Via probable worlds – an agent first looks for justificatory phenomena in the real
world that might correspond to its beliefs and then gradually builds up a coherent and
plausible interpretation of this correspondence.
Plausibility and probability constitute alternative yet complementary bases for action.

Whereas the first bases action on the coherence of an experience – does it make sense? – the
second bases action on the robustness of the experience’s replication – i.e. on its reliable
correspondence to some recurring state of the world. Both help to underpin action, but each
may kick in at a different moment on the journey from belief to action. In the early stages of
any innovative process, for example, replication is hard to come by, if not impossible. For this
reason entrepreneurial mindsets are more likely to look for plausibility and coherence before
acting than managerial mindsets. The managerial mindset will look mainly to probability and
correspondence to justify its actions. As experience accumulates over time and repeats,
plausibility gradually gives way to probability as a basis for action.
If we think of a “mindset” as the embedded epistemology that an agent employs to
navigate a path from possible worlds to actual worlds, there are two basic types of
navigating mindsets. We will call the navigating strategy using the path through plausible
worlds the entrepreneurial mindset. An entrepreneurial epistemology seeks to extract real
world value by enacting plausibilities. On the other hand, the navigating strategy using
the path through probable worlds employs what we will call a managerial mindset. An
embedded managerial epistemology seeks to extract real world value by enacting
probabilities.
Entrepreneurial and managerial mindsets will each draw on their respective
epistemologies as a basis for action. Whereas the managerial mindset seeks evidence and
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uses probabilities to justify its actions to others – stakeholders, shareholders, etc typically, the entrepreneurial mindset need not. By contrast, whereas the entrepreneurial
mindset has to have the courage of its conviction in its beliefs – after all, it typically has to
“put its money where its mouth is” – the managerial mindset can afford to be more
tentative in its beliefs before acting on them as long as it can justify them.
Now, as the uncertainties associated with the process of innovation are gradually
removed or converted into measurable risk, and as the number of stakeholders associated
with the process increases, the entrepreneurial mindset is required to cross the boundary
between entrepreneurial and managerial epistemologies. Likewise, as firms experience the
need to change and renew themselves – and hence to behave more entrepreneurially – the
managerial mindset is required to cross the boundary in the other direction. There are
costs and benefits, both personal and institutional, associated with such boundary
crossing. Not everyone can make it.
These alternative mindsets and their associated navigation paths have profound
implications for knowledge management.

After a brief review of the current state of

knowledge management we will look at these implications.
3. Knowledge Management: Between the Possible, the Plausible, the Probable and the
Actual
As is often the case with emerging fields of professionalization, much of what today
passes for knowledge management has its origins in practice – and in particular, in the spread
of information and communication technologies.11 And, as elsewhere, practitioners of
knowledge management have not until now been much troubled by epistemological or
foundational issues. This uncertain progression from a casual and empirical stance to a more
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theoretically informed one is a well-established phenomenon.12 Steel making in the nineteenth
century, for example, was largely a matter of empirical trial and error that preceded the
development of metallurgy as a science.13 Steel making, then, was understood empirically
long before it was understood theoretically. But the kind of concrete knowledge embodied in
such empirically derived practices was highly local and hard to replicate in a controlled
manner. It lacked any capacity for leveraging, for getting extensively applied beyond the local
context. The potential for leveraging is the great advantage that abstract science-based
knowledge enjoys over more empirical practices, rooted as they often are in the vagaries of
craft traditions.14 Such knowledge can have relevance and can be applied over a much wider
and more diverse range of circumstances. The gradual application of science-based
knowledge to steel making helps to explain why the total world output for steel grew from
500 000 tons in 1870 to a total of 28 million tons by the turn of the century.15
However, to date much of the knowledge that has been of interest to knowledge
management has tended to be concrete and local in nature. It consists of rules of thumb,
anecdotes, and best practices assembled and deployed within one organization and/or its
related network, but not beyond it. Knowledge management thereby contributes to making
better use of the knowledge that an organization already possesses. “Knowing what it knows”
spares an organization the expense of ‘reinventing the wheel’. There is typically no intention
of leveraging such knowledge beyond the confines of a single organization or network of
linked organizations. The resulting knowledge “makes sense” - it gives them the right gut
feeling to those who directly share the relevant experiences. But because the knowledge is
local, replication and dissemination is a problem. Such knowledge is plausible, but only to
those who directly experience it or to those who can take such experiencing on trust.
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However, if knowledge is to move from small local populations to larger and more distant
ones, access to the direct experiences that gave rise to such knowledge becomes increasingly
problematic. How is another agent to trust such knowledge? How is a claim of having
knowledge to be justified? To be justified, claims of having knowledge require independent
and replicable testing. The results of such testing create knowledge patterns that follow
distributions, and thereby allow resulting claims of knowledge to rest on probabilities.
Contemporary knowledge management to date has contributed even less to the
creation of significant new knowledge. We say “contemporary” because there is one form of
knowledge management that has been outstandingly successful in this respect. We refer to the
practices of the scientific community.16 This kind of knowledge management has been around
for some time. But the creation of knowledge by the scientific community does not follow the
“logic” of knowledge creation as practiced in a corporate environment or, indeed, that
advocated by knowledge management practitioners. The different ‘logics’ show up as
differences in emphasis. In all three cases the key concern has been with control of the
diffusion of new knowledge. Yet whereas the scientific community’s primary concern has
been with the epistemological validity of the newly created knowledge, that of the corporate
community has been with the economic utility of such knowledge.
The philosophy of science has a sub-branch – methodology - that takes the validity of
knowledge as its central concern.17 It attempts to endow the practice of science with solid
epistemological foundations. The more solid those foundations, the greater is the potential for
leveraging scientific knowledge, both existing and new, and reliably extending its application
to new fields. Arguably, it is precisely the absence of solid epistemological foundations that is
undermining the numerous attempts at leveraging corporate knowledge creation both within
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and across organizations. Yet because its primary concern has been with the utility rather than
with the validity of knowledge beyond the boundaries of the firm, knowledge management as
practiced by corporations has not so far felt any pressing need to secure its epistemological
foundations. One plausible explanation for this, perhaps, is the daunting nature of the task: a
two-and-a-half-thousand-year old debate on the nature of knowledge that goes back to Plato
has not so far made those foundations any more secure. Drawing a boundary between useful
and useless knowledge, therefore, may be easier for a corporation to do than drawing a
boundary between valid and invalid knowledge.
So far we have argued that entrepreneurial and managerial mindsets arise in different
circumstances and tend to draw on different epistemologies. As circumstances change,
however, these mindsets not only need to cross epistemological boundaries, but they also need
to be aware that they have crossed them. In the next section we briefly explore the nature of
these boundaries and to show how they can be construed as sources of opportunities for those
who know when and how to move across them.
4. Epistemology and Knowledge Management
From an epistemological perspective, the key skill in knowledge management involves
understanding the basis on which an agent can move the products of its thoughts across the
epistemological boundaries represented by the circles of our Venn diagram – i.e. from one
type of world to the other. Both the worlds of the plausible and of the probable, for example,
are sources of potentially fruitful hypotheses. If carefully analyzed and reflected upon, such
hypotheses gradually gain in plausibility. On the other hand, if repeatedly corroborated
through testing, they become more probable. In both cases they improve their epistemic
status. Yet the world of the possible is large relative to the worlds either of the probable or of
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the plausible, and when it comes to hypothesis selection, it offers an excessive amount of
choice. An agent needs a good reason for selecting one hypothesis rather than another for
further development and testing, since such activities consume scarce resources – after all,
even options have a carrying cost.
In the world of the possible, if no prior distribution is available, no expectation can be
built on the basis of recurrence. It must therefore be built on the coherence of the expectation
relative to our other beliefs that act to constrain it.18 This is a theory-driven, sense-making
activity that gives plausibility to an expectation and reduces subjective feelings of uncertainty.
If, in contrast, phenomena exhibit recurrence and prior distributions are therefore available, an
agent can subordinate the need for making sense of things to establishing a correspondence
between prior beliefs and recurrent phenomena. Thus it will be the states of the world that
suggest the appropriate trajectory to follow in moving from a possible to an actual world.
Given the lack of replicable precedents under conditions of innovation, the
entrepreneurial mindset will tend to favour an initial move from possible to plausible worlds.
It will then enact for itself the replications that will lead them into the region of Figure 1
where the plausible intersects the probable. It will do so by constantly testing prior
assumptions against accumulating empirical evidence in a process known as discovery-driven
planning. The managerial mindset, by contrast, focused as it is on the need to justify its
epistemic stance, is generally more disposed to move into actual worlds via probable ones,
and to build its theories on the basis of available empirical evidence rather than seeking out
evidence in support of a priori theories that have been subjectively derived.
Society has a large say in establishing what gets placed within each of our worlds and
what gets excluded, what constitutes legitimate moves across epistemological boundaries and
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what does not,19 and what gets emphasized or played down. French culture, for example is
more likely to stress coherence than Anglo-Saxon culture, which is more drawn to an
empirical approach, and hence to correspondence. Chinese culture on the other hand will
stress the complexity and multi-causal nature of phenomena in contrast to western cultures
operating on the principle of Occam’s razor and the quest for simple explanations.20 Chinese
culture is thus likely to draw the boundaries more loosely around our worlds than cultures
reared in the Western scientific tradition.
Firms will often take their cues from established social practice in drawing boundaries.
And for them as for other institutions, the issue will be one of balance. Draw the boundaries
too tightly and you stifle innovative moves; draw them too loosely and scarce resources are
squandered. The issue of balance leads us back to the question raised by Ashby’s law of
requisite variety. How much variety is actually requisite? Does every instance of variety call
for a response? We can illustrate the nature of the issue by means of a diagram that presents
Ashby’s Law in a graphic form (see figure 2). The vertical axis of the diagram measures the
variety of the stimuli to which a system is subjected. The horizontal axis measures the variety
of the responses available to the system. Ashby’s law locates adaptive responses on or below
the diagonal in the diagram– i.e. the variety of a response at least matches the variety of the
stimulus that provoked it. Yet, as we saw earlier, in a regime of high-variety stimuli, the sheer
variety of responses that appears to be required might well lead to the disintegration of the
system. At the other extreme, a system with little on no variety in its responses eventually
fossilizes or gets selected out. (See figure 3)
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The challenge for any living system, then, is to navigate between the twin threats of
disintegration and unresponsiveness. Living systems endowed with cognitive capacities,
however, have successfully evolved responses to representations triggered by the stimuli
rather than to the stimuli themselves, that is, they draw on prior knowledge of the stimuli to
filter out those elements of stimulus variety that constitute noise, concentrating their response
on the much smaller variety of information-bearing stimuli that remain. In Figure 3 this more
‘cognitive’ strategy is indicated by the line AB’. In contrast with the horizontal line AA’, it
does not attempt to match the variety of a given set of stimuli on a one-to-one basis with a
given set of responses. Rather, through a filtering and interpretive process, it reduces the
variety of the response called for by reducing the number of stimuli that it actually needs to
respond to. The epistemological challenge for knowledge management may well be to help us
decide how far down the scale we can legitimately move and still be responding to valid
knowledge.

The behavioural route responds directly to stimuli
without filtering out the noise

The cognitive route filters out noise from
stimuli and focuses on their representation
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Figure 3: Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety

Applying this thinking now to Figure 1, it is clear that moving towards the rim of the outer
circle, 1, is a variety-seeking strategy that moves us up the vertical scale of Figure 2, whereas
moving towards the intersection of circles 2 and 3 in the figure is a variety-reducing one that
moves us down the vertical scale.
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Looking at it another way, moving inward in the diagram from circle 1 to the intersection
of circles 2 and 3 involves exercising options that already exist. Moving outward from the
intersection to Circle 1, by contrast, involves creating new options. The movement inward,
towards the intersection of circles 2 and 3, reduces uncertainty and renders knowledge more
reliable and usable. Since it represents a movement towards increasing constraint, it will be
incremental in nature. It can be associated with a process of exploitation, one that builds up
and consolidates existing knowledge. The movement outward, by contrast, broadens the
horizons of awareness and can sometimes lead to a radical restructuring of what has already
accumulated in the inner regions. It can be associated with a process of exploration, the
creation of new knowledge.21 Exploitation, then, is likely to stabilize and consolidate the
existing knowledge base whereas exploration is likely to destabilize it and make it contingent.
In Kuhnian terms we might say that inward movement entails puzzle solving whereas outward
movement will often look more like paradigm creation.
Our analysis suggests that an effective knowledge management process would not
only attempt to strike a balance respectively between outward and inward movements in
Figure 1 – i.e. between variety-seeking exploration and variety-reducing exploitation - but it
would also establish which of the different regions of the Venn diagram it was operating in at
any given moment so as to match the behavioural strategy required to the epistemic resources
available– i.e. it would align the relevant mindset – in our case, entrepreneurial or managerial
– to the nature of the task and the knowledge available.
The foregoing has implications for the way we think about the process of innovation.
Schumpeter placed innovation at the heart of the process of economic development. He
viewed it not as the fruit of rational planning, but rather as the unleashing of ‘gales of creative
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destruction’.22 Innovation, then, offers benefits to society, but it comes with a cost to some
individual firms. A parallel problem exists for firms:

new products and processes can

disruptivley supplant the firm’s established order. Innovation thus produces growth, but it
also produces losers as well as winners. Many agents inside firms would prefer not to risk
being losers. They thus tend to favour reinforcing incumbency rather than encourage
innovation – i.e. the managerial rather than the entrepreneurial mindset – and for this reason
are thus skewed toward a trajectory that favours probable over plausible worlds – i.e. circle 3
over circle 2 in Figure 1. Small wonder that a managerial mindset dominates managerial
practice, and thereby knowledge management practice and even managerial education today.
Can we reduce the costs of firm-level creative destruction to the losers? Indeed, do
they have to be cast as losers at all? When viewed from an evolutionary perspective, one of
epistemology’s key insights was that ‘hypotheses could die in our stead’.23 Embodied in
appropriate policies, this insight should increase our tolerance for higher levels of uncertainty,
and encourage us to aim for bolder hypotheses, hypotheses that strike us as plausible on the
basis of their innate coherence rather than of their initial correspondence with the facts. To
repeat: correspondence with the facts is typically not on offer in the early phases of a genuine
innovation. The facts do not yet exist.
We can summarize the above points by means of Table 1, in which the cognitive
inputs required by the different types of worlds that we have been discussing are each
associated with specific kinds of knowledge management tools and where each creates a
specific kind of value as an output.
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World:

Knowledge
Inputs

Actions

Outputs

Investment
Criterion

Possibilities

Hunches

Real option
investments

Real Option potential

Real option
value

Plausibilities

Speculations

Speculative
investments

Probabilities

Estimates

Risk adjusted
investments

Actualities

Calculations

Contracts

Knightian rent
potential
(Potential
entrepreneurial profits)
Profit potential
(Potential normal
profits)
Profits (normal or
abnormal)

Subjective
NPV
Objective NPV
Optimal
solution

Knowledge
Management
Processing
Tools
Brainstorming
and scenario
analysis
Pattern
generation and
recognition
tools
Statistical
processing and
analysis tools
Optimization
techniques

Table 1: Knowable Worlds and their Tools

Table 1 lays out in a systems format the challenges that confront the practice of
knowledge management: inputs required, actions required, outputs expected and criteria for
investment decisions. These will vary depending on the epistemological space you are
operating in. We progress from possibilities towards actualities as we move down the table.
Note that profits are an output only in an actual world; in all other worlds profits have
potential, and with different degrees of likelihood.
The spaces in which knowledge management practices are currently the least
developed, and therefore the least effective, are those describing possible worlds and plausible
worlds - especially possible worlds, for which to our knowledge, few really successful
practices have been created.

Yet, in the absence of credible and powerful knowledge

management methodologies that can identify hunches and evaluate the option potential of
hunches, identify speculative investments and assess their Knightian rent potential, managers

32

will naturally gravitate to risk adjusted investments, with their more certain and therefore
normal, as opposed to abnormal, profit potential.
Confining our epistemologies to a managerial mindset focussed on the worlds of
probabilities and actualities in the bottom two rows of the table thus denies us access both to
the rent potential of option values and access to Knightian rent potential.
In a world of pure possibilities, for example, we can invest in low cost real options
based on hunches derived from vaguely linked beliefs, which if successful create real option
potential that has option value. In this world, knowledge management can draw off and
improve brainstorming and scenario generation processes with a view to helping the firm to
surface more and better possibilities and assess them as option candidates. One reason why
scenario planning has had difficulty establishing itself is because it has not articulated an
explicit relationship between its epistemology and the process of creating of option values.
Evaluation of such opportunities calls for knowledge management tools that identify those
options opportunities with superior properties: upside potential , potential control of downside
and potential sustainability.24
On the plausibility front, knowledge management tools that enhance pattern
generation and recognition need to be developed that will encourage searches for patterns of
coherence and thereby more aggressive generation and exploration of plausible opportunities
to commit resources to speculative investments that the firm alone can see. Much more
aggressive development of text processing and text pattern recognition methodologies would
be a major place to start.
In conclusion, by highlighting the extent to which knowledge management has been
concentrating on the bottom two rows of Table 1, we can begin to appreciate both how far it
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has been underselling itself as well as the scope that it has for broadening its agenda.
Knowledge management can and should restore epistemic legitimacy to an entrepreneurial
mindset that is primarily located in the top two rows of the table. This is partly a matter of
cognitive style but partly also a matter of education. We keep teaching people that there are
right and wrong answers to be derived by analysis. In some areas, to be sure, there will be; in
others, however, we ourselves create the right answers by enacting them, thus converting a
possible or a plausible prospect into a probable or an actual one. Reduce the social,
organizational, and personal costs of operating in possible or in plausible worlds, improve the
payoff for doing so, and more people will start behaving entrepreneurially. But to take on this
task, knowledge management needs to come to grips with epistemological issues.
5.Conclusion

In this paper, we have made four points:
1. The Managerial and entrepreneurial mindsets operate with different epistemologies that
reflect differences in their respective circumstances. The entrepreneurial mindset operates
under conditions of novelty and uncertainty, ones in which prior probability distributions,
being non-existent, can offer little guidance, and in which coherence is the epistemological
underpinning . The managerial mindset, by contrast, is constrained to seek justification from
probability distributions and thus cannot operate in their absence, so that correspondence is
the epistemological underpinning.
2.

Within each mindset the agent navigates from a world of possibilities to one of

actualities, but through a different trajectory. The entrepreneurial mindset attempts to enact
bold yet plausible hypotheses that create their own reality; the managerial mindset acts on the
basis of objectively verifiable facts and constraints from which it derives hypotheses with a
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high degree of probability. The first epistemic strategy will be appropriate under conditions of
novelty and uncertainty. The second will be appropriate where accumulated and objectively
verifiable experience is available.
4.

Current institutional practice is heavily skewed in favour of the managerial mindset.

Knowledge management could help to redress the balance, but only if it becomes more
epistemologically aware.
5.

In particular there is a need for knowledge management tools that allow agents to develop

and explore possibilities –especially to generate and process possibilities- and also to develop
and explore plausibilities -especially generate more and bolder ones. Seed tools already exist
but need more epistemologically oriented development. These are brainstroming and scenario
planning for possibilities, and pattern recognition tools like text processing and analysis for
plausibilities.
The above has implications for theory. Much of modern management thinking has been
inspired by the success of large established enterprises that operate on the basis of well-tested
routines, well-documented facts, and hence articulable probability distributions. Starting with
the Scientific Management movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, the
managerial mindset has come to dominate both management education and management
practice. As a result, the entrepreneurial mindset has got crowded out.
Yet the entrepreneurial mindset, it turns out, may have a broader scope than what is
offered by purely entrepreneurial settings. As the level of uncertainty goes up in many walks
of life, the entrepreneurial approach to the management of knowledge will surely grow in
importance. When should we use it and when should we have recourse to a more traditional
epistemological stance? Answers to this question have important implications for the way we
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select governance mechanisms appropriate to different mixes of risk and uncertainty. In a
regime of multiple and complementary epistemologies, a “one size fits all” approach to the
problem of corporate governance cannot convincingly deliver. Yet, the near-total absence of
any knowledge management contribution to the debates provoked by the recent Enron,
WordCom, and other scandals, suggests that the discipline has not begun to address the
challenges that it faces at the level of governance.
Our findings also have implication for Practice. We have stressed that we are dealing
with mindsets and not with particular individuals. Large corporations are as much in need of
entrepreneurial mindsets as they are of managerial ones. However, building an entrepreneurial
mindset will require the explicit development of internal organizational procedures that both
counterbalance and complement existing managerial mindsets. Corporate venturing activities,
for example, have often suffered when submitted to internal evaluation procedures that reflect
the predominance of the managerial mindset.
New procedures need to be put in place in organizations that aspire to entrepreneurial
behaviour, procedures that acknowledge the contingent nature of the epistemologies under
which organizations operate. The procedures will vary from firm to firm, but we believe that
at a minimum they should observe the following principles:
•

Develop systematic procedures for distinguishing between risk and uncertainty. Is the
situation repetitive and hence amenable to probabilistic thinking, or is it so novel that
little or no prior data can really guide a decision?

•

Separate out the management of uncertainty from that of risk. They are not the same.
If a proposed venture is uncertain rather than risky – that is, neither the full range of
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possible outcomes nor their respective likelihood can be identified - do not submit it to
the quantification requirements of a risky situation.
•

In order to manage uncertainty, develop skills in creating and linking together options
that can be exercised in different sequences as the states of nature become known.

•

Establish in which of the different worlds – possible, plausible, probable, actual – a
venture proposal is currently located, and for each develop systematic evaluation
criteria that are appropriate both to what can reasonably be known as well as to the
chosen trajectory from one world to another. As suggested above, for example, do not
ask for quantified estimates in possible or plausible worlds where none are to be had.
In plausible worlds, focus on the coherence of a proposal and on the consistency of its
underlying assumptions rather than on their likelihood.

•

When dealing with entrepreneurial proposals, move away from the analytically
oriented business plan questions of ‘how do you know that this will happen?’ This is
the possible-to- probable world trajectory of managers. Instead, move toward the more
action-oriented entrepreneurial question of ‘what actions will you undertake to make
this happen?’ This is the possible-to-plausible world trajectory or entrepreneurs. In
order to evaluate entrepreneurial proposals, insist on the construction of scenarios for
the possible outcomes of such actions together with the identification of the options
available should something like the scenario come to pass.

•

Until there is a cadre of internal people with an entrepreneurial mindset, choose
outside entrepreneurs to carry out the evaluation of plausible and possible proposals
rather than managers.
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•

Avoid procedures that filter out entrepreneurial proposals prematurely. Allow such
ideas to ferment during the evaluation phase. If they are radically new, they may need
getting used to.

Appendix: Epistemological Issues
Since Plato, we have assumed that knowledge has a truth condition – i.e. a proposition
either corresponds with the facts, is coherent with a wider system of propositions, or has
pragmatic cognitive value. It can, of course have all of these. Also, knowledge implies belief
but the converse is not generally held to be true.25 A belief is a dispositional psychological
state and a belief can be false. To satisfy the belief condition for knowledge, such satisfaction
must be “appropriately related” to the satisfaction of its truth condition. A proposition is
epistemically permissible26 if consistent with a given set of epistemic rules of evidence; it is
epistemically good if based on adequate grounds. Less normative, perhaps, is the demand that
the justification of a proposition be based on evidential support. A contextualist view of
justification that is endorsed, for example, by Dewey, Wittgenstein and Thomas Kuhn, holds
that all justified beliefs depend for their evidential support on some unjustified beliefs that
themselves need no justification. These will vary from context to context and from social
group to social group27. Yet whatever one’s approach, questions of justification attract the
lion’s share of attention in contemporary epistemology.
Epistemology concerns itself with the limits of knowledge – and by implication with
its scope. The more restrictively we draw the boundaries around what we take to be
knowledge, the more skeptical we are. The most extreme forms of skepticism hold that we are
not actually justified in believing anything at all!28 But is the justification of beliefs to be
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based on their predictive performance or on the understanding they give rise to? If on the first,
then the quantum theory must be counted an outstandingly successful instance of justification
– after all, the whole of modern electronics is based on it. If on the second, then it must be
recognized that the theory remains highly problematic.29 Feynman famously remarked that,
whatever they might claim, no one really understands the quantum theory.30
In recent decades, justification has been progressively “naturalized”.31 In contrast to
theories of justified beliefs that concentrate on probabilistic or logical relations between a
hypothesis and the evidence for it, the naturalized approach looks at the psychological
processes at work in developing the belief. Alvin Goldman, for one, holds that one can only
justify a belief if one can show that it has been produced by a reliable belief-forming
process.32 But where, exactly, should we locate such a ‘belief-forming process’? Dretske
(1981), for example, adopts an information-theoretic approach that has the possibilities for
knowledge dependent on the physical capacity of instruments, gauges, neurons, etc, to pick up
and process signals from the environment, extracting the relevant information from them. And
almost as a natural extension of such an approach, naturalistic epistemology has been linked
both to artificial intelligence and to the history of science.33 Inspired by models of population
biology and economics, naturalistic epistemology has also been analyzed from a social
perspective in which both power and authority relations can shape beliefs.34
Given these trends, we will not be surprised to discover that naturalistic epistemology
had developed an affinity with evolutionary epistemology, a term coined by the social
psychologist Donald Campbell to describe a theory of knowledge that is both inspired by and
derived from organic evolutionary processes. One variant of such a theory that goes back to
“Darwin’s bulldog”, T.H. Huxley, sees the growth of knowledge – particularly scientific
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knowledge – as analogous to the transformation of organisms through processes of variation,
selection and retention.35 Another variant, which was espoused by Darwin himself, sees the
process as literal, with our thinking capacities being channeled in certain directions by the
biological selection processes that we are subject to.36 Some supporters of the latter variant
identify with Quine’s naturalistic epistemology. A naturalistic epistemology takes the human
subject as a natural phenomenon and studies its epistemic activity empirically. Quine argued
that epistemology should be a branch of psychology, a study of how organisms take sensory
stimulations as inputs and use them to output theories of the three-dimensional world. It is
descriptive rather than normative although it could be made normative according to Quine.
Naturalistic epistemology, recognizing that in the real world, certainty is rarely, if
ever, on offer, has more pragmatic aims. In line with a proposal originally put forward by the
philosopher of probability, F.P. Ramsey, it is happy to take as knowledge whatever subsets of
an organism’s beliefs it is willing to act upon providing that these contribute to its survival
and – in the case of human organisms – to its prosperity.37 A requirement for justification and
objectivity in this scheme merely translates into a requirement for inter-subjective agreement.
A requirement for truth translates into a good fit between an agent’s beliefs and his or her
stock of prior experiences rather than between such beliefs and some “God’s eye” view of the
states of the world. As Lackoff and Putnam have each shown, such an approach to
knowledge, by linking it to the conditions under which action is possible, opens up the field to
multiple, non-exclusive epistemologies.38
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If the wilder forms of relativism are to be

avoided, however, it poses the challenge of understanding the nature of the boundaries that
might help one to distinguish one epistemology from the other, and by implication, the
circumstances under which each can validly be drawn upon.
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